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ARMS CONTROL 2.0: UPDATING THE
CYBERWEAPON ARMS CONTROL
FRAMEWORK
Evan Mulbry *

ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes multiple problems with the existing arms
control framework for cyberweapons as well as surveillance
technology and calls for four specific areas of reform. First, the
existing framework does not specifically enumerate the software
controlled under existing arms control treaties, which can lead to gaps
in international export control compliance. Cyberweapons should be
enumerated with greater specificity to prevent confusing and disjointed
implementation by states. Second, the divide between Wassenaar and
Shanghai Cooperation Organization conceptions of what constitutes a
cyberweapon reduces the effectiveness of international control because
nations do not share an agreed upon cyberweapon definition. States
should form a multilateral treaty utilizing a shared definition to ensure
cyberweapon exports are regulated by a treaty and include a greater
diversity of countries covering a larger share of this market. Third, the
Wassenaar Arrangement, the current treaty regulating many
cyberweapon exports, fails to impose strict controls on cyberweapons
and surveillance technology. Under the Wassenaar Arrangement,
cyberweapons and surveillance technology should be listed as “very
sensitive items” and subject to additional control because exports can
lead to derivative viruses, which multiply the harm of the original
export. Finally, the existing framework is unclear in its differentiation
between cyberweapons subject to strict control as weapons and those
subject to less control as dual-use items. International control lists
should include an addendum to the general rule assigning particular
types of software to consistently implement each category across
jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a catastrophe striking your community, without physical
damage to major infrastructure. Water systems fail. Electricity, telephone,
1
and wireless communication grids fail. All networks are down. Rivers and
water systems are contaminated because the computers controlling the
2
chemical balance fail. Critically ill patients begin to pass away as lifesaving
3
machines fail to properly function. This type of catastrophe is what
cyberweapons can inflict on society by attacking critical infrastructure.
Cyberweapons have evolved as one of the most significant threats to
4
international peace and security since the invention of the atomic bomb.
Current analysis focuses on this threat in the context of their impact such as
what constitutes an act of war, but with less attention paid to their

1.
Beatrice Christofaro, Cyberattacks Are the Newest Frontier of War and Can Strike
Harder Than a Natural Disaster. Here’s Why the US Could Struggle to Cope If It Got Hit.,
BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cyber-attack-usstruggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4.
2.
See, e.g., A Cyber-attack on an American Water Plant Rattles Nerves, ECONOMIST
(Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/02/09/a-cyber-attack-on-anamerican-water-plant-rattles-nerves.
3.
Shashank Joshi, A Murderous Cyber-Attack Is Only a Matter of Time, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2020/11/17/a-murderouscyber-attack-is-only-a-matter-of-time.
4.
See, e.g., World Teeters on Cyber-War Brink, ITWIRE (May 22, 2012, 3:27
PM), https://www.itwire.com/business-it-news/security/54797-world-teeters-on-cyberwar-brink.
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5

acquisition. The United Nations (“UN”) stated cyberoperations are
6
governed by international law, but did not delineate the legal boundaries
for cyberweapon transfer from government to private actors and transfers
7
across borders from private actors to other governments.
Issues regarding cyberweapon transfers are important because they
enable actors with poor human rights records to access sophisticated
cyberweapons and surveillance technology. For example, British Aerospace
Engineering (“BAE”) Systems sold sophisticated cyber technology under
8
the current framework to states such as Saudi Arabia, which has violated
9
numerous human rights according to Amnesty International. While it is
impossible to determine whether BAE’s software was responsible, this type
of sophisticated surveillance software enabled some Gulf States, such as
Saudi Arabia, to make social media activists “vanish” during the Arab
10
Spring. One former Saudi Air Force officer noted 90% of the most active
11
campaigners in 2011 have now disappeared. In defending against
accusations of impropriety, BAE noted all of its software transfers were in
12
accordance with Danish export laws, which implement major international
arms agreements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (the
13
“Wassenaar Arrangement”). However, current international agreements do
not include strong enough restrictions that could have prevented this sale.
This example highlights a problem created in the international arms
control framework: international controls on cyberweapons including
surveillance technology do not accurately reflect the threat they pose to
societies. Because surveillance software and other cyberweapons (for
14
example, intrusion software) are controlled items generally, but are not
5.
See, e.g., Stephanie Gosnell Handler, The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a
Legal Approach to Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare, 48 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 209,
215–25 (2012).
6.
Detlov Wolter, The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity, ARMS
CONTROL ASS’N (2013), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-09/un-takes-big-step-forwardcybersecurity#source.
7.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).
8.
How BAE Sold Cyber-Surveillance Tools to Arab States, BBC (June 15, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40276568.
9.
AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2020/21: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 309–13 (2021) (mentioning Saudi Arabia’s repeat human rights
violations, including invoking the Anti-Cyber Crime Law to silence critics).
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
See About Us, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us
[hereinafter About Wassenaar Agreement] (last updated June 22, 2021).
14.
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies: List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions
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escalated to the status of “very sensitive,” their export is less restricted.
Implementing stronger controls in the Wassenaar Arrangement and ensuring
proper execution by its parties may have blocked this transaction.
This Note argues cyberweapons pose a significant threat to international
peace in the coming century and that countries should cooperate to
supplement existing international agreements to restrict the cross-border
transfer of cyberweapons to and from private actors as well as governments.
In doing so, this Note discusses both offensive weapons and surveillance
technology as cyber weapons because both fall within the cyber-arms
17
industry. Part I discusses the background of cyberweapon international
arms control. Part II outlines the problematic gaps in the current
international arms control framework related to cyberweapons. Part III
provides solutions to address the unique concerns of cyberweapons and how
the global community can take steps to reduce the cross-border transfers of
cyberweapons. Part IV summarizes and concludes the Note.

I. BACKGROUND
Stuxnet was a computer virus that began infecting Iranian networks in
18
2007 and was the world’s first identified cyberweapon. American and
Israeli operatives originally designed Stuxnet to attack Iranian nuclear
infrastructure by infiltrating industrial computers and searching for the
Siemens Step 7 software, an industrial software used to control nuclear
19
manufacturing processes. After identifying this software, Stuxnet would
update it with code that hijacked different processes to damage nuclear
production infrastructure while simultaneously sending updates to the
20
operator that no issues were present. The operator would not be aware
21
there was a problem until the equipment began to self-destruct. Despite
Stuxnet’s ultimate discovery by Iran, newer versions of the code continued
List, category 2, pt. 5, Dec. 5, 2019, WA-LIST (19) 1 [hereinafter Wassenaar
Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods], https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2020/12
/Public-Docs-Vol-II-2020-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List-Dec20-3.pdf.
15.
See id. at 178.
16.
See Daryl Kimball, The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar (last reviewed Dec. 2017).
17.
See, e.g., Von Jacob Appelbaum et al., NSA Preps America for Future Battle,
SPIEGEL INT’L (Jan. 17, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/newsnowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html (describing
the U.S. government as stockpiling cyber-arms including surveillance technology).
18.
Joshua Alvarez, Stuxnet: The World’s First Cyber Weapon, STAN. CTR. FOR INT’L
SEC. AND COOP. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/stuxnet.
19.
See What is Stuxnet?, MCAFEE, https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/securityawareness/ransomware/what-is-stuxnet.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
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to damage Iranian nuclear infrastructure for several weeks after its initial
22
discovery.

A. Characteristics of a Cyberweapon
As one of the original cyberweapons, the Stuxnet example demonstrates
three aspects of cyberweapons that differentiate them from conventional
kinetic weapons such as bullets and bombs. First, cyberweapons can be
23
designed to target a specific country’s systems or infrastructure. The
24
Stuxnet virus was originally designed to only damage Iranian facilities, a
characteristic unique to cyberweapons, because when specifically designed,
there should be little collateral damage apart from the intended target. It is
estimated that the Stuxnet virus damaged 984 Iranian centrifuges at one
25
nuclear facility alone.
Second, once unleashed, a cyberweapon can create unintended
derivative viruses. The designers of the Stuxnet virus intended for it to be
inoperable after June 2012, but enterprising coders developed derivative
26
viruses based on the Stuxnet design. The computer security agency
McAfee reports that at least six viruses have been designed based on
27
Stuxnet’s original code. Derivative viruses have been used by non-state
actors to attack critical infrastructure, such as power plants, water treatment
facilities, and other public services. For example, in 2013, the Russian
hacker group, “Energetic Bear,” used a Stuxnet derivative (Havex) to access
28
sensitive European critical infrastructure information. Industroyer, another
29
Stuxnet variant, is able to control power station infrastructure. In 2015 and
2016, portions of the Ukrainian power grid were taken offline when the
Industroyer virus was used to manipulate the Ukrainian power grid into
30
overloading. What makes the Industroyer virus a particularly potent

22.
David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-orderedwave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
William J. Broad et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast
/16stuxnet.html.
26.
What is Stuxnet?, supra note 19.
27.
Id.
28.
Eduard Kovacs, Attackers Using Havex RAT Against Industrial Control Systems,
SEC. WEEK (June 24, 2014), https://www.securityweek.com/attackers-using-havex-ratagainst-industrial-control-systems.
29.
What is Stuxnet?, supra note 19.
30.
Anton Cherepanov & Robert Lipovsky, Industroyer: Biggest Threat to Industrial Control
Systems Since Stuxnet, WELIVESECURITY (June 12, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017
/06/12/industroyer-biggest-threat-industrial-control-systems-since-stuxnet.
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variant of Stuxnet is that it can “speak” to legacy infrastructure and impair
31
electricity infrastructure that was not designed with network security.
Thirdly, cyberweapons make attributing a particular attack difficult. No
state has officially taken responsibility for Stuxnet, and one of the only
mentions of attribution occurred during an Israeli General’s retirement
32
party, where Stuxnet was mentioned as one of his successful operations.
Despite this lack of official acknowledgement, it is widely believed the
33
United States and Israel were responsible for developing Stuxnet. For
traditional kinetic weapons, establishing the responsible actor is easier
because one can usually trace the weapon back to its deployment. For
example, if a bomb falls on a particular place, one can attribute the attack to
a particular actor by seeing which planes dropped the bomb. Cyberattacks
34
are more difficult to track. Even though attacks, such as Stuxnet, always
leave a trail, the work required to determine the ultimate culprit can take
35
weeks or months. One key aspect of attribution analysis requires
36
investigating the malware used in the attack. The current arms control
framework creates a problem because this information is not widely shared
since many cyberweapon and surveillance technology exporting countries
37
are not a party to these multilateral regimes.

B. Current Arms Control Framework
Despite the current regime’s imperfections, efforts have been made to
reduce the proliferation of cyberweapons. There are multiple arms control
treaties, such as the Australia Group, addressing various facets of the
38
international weapons market. Within this multitude of different
agreements, these new weapons would logically fall within the Wassenaar
39
Arrangement.
At the end of the Cold War, the international community was concerned
40
about unrestricted access to weapons. To prevent the unfettered spread of
31.
Id.
32.
See Josh Fruhlinger, What Is Stuxnet, Who Created It And How Does It Work?,
CSO U.S. ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2017, 2:39 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3218104
/what-is-stuxnet-who-created-it-and-how-does-it-work.html.
33.
Id.
34.
OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., A GUIDE TO CYBER ATTRIBUTION 2 (2018).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 3.
37.
For example, China and Israel are not a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, which
is a major part of the international arms control framework. See About Wassenaar
Arrangement, supra note 13.
38.
E.g., Daryl Kimball, The Australia Group at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup (last reviewed Mar. 2021).
39.
See id.; Origins, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar.org/aboutus (click “Origins” tab) [hereinafter Wassenaar Arrangement Origins] (last updated June 22,
2021).
40.
Wassenaar Arrangement Origins, supra note 39.
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arms, a group of thirty-three countries founded a multilateral agreement
requiring countries to individually implement export controls related to
41
42
dual-use and military technology. This arrangement became known as
43
the Wassenaar Arrangement and governed dual-use military and non44
military item transfer between governments and private actors. The
45
Wassenaar Arrangement advocates for a licensing system at the national
level where the government reviews individual transactions for illicit
46
activities.
When cyberweapons were being exported by Wassenaar Arrangement
members, they incorporated these new weapons into the legacy regime
47
instead of developing an overarching cyberweapon arms control treaty. In
December 2013, the Wassenaar Arrangement was amended to include
intrusion software in response to exports of this software to countries with a
48
history of human rights abuses such as Libya.
This amendment received different industry responses in Europe and
the United States. In Europe, adoption of the intrusion software update was
49
implemented verbatim in October 2014. However, in the United States
50
there was opposition to the Commerce Control List amendments because
51
industry groups believed the agency’s definition was too broad. More than
264 comments were submitted by trade associations, affected companies,
52
and even members of Congress. For example, the Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute believed the amendment to the regulations
41.
A “dual-use” item is one that has civil applications as well as terrorism and military
or weapons of mass destruction-related applications. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2021). For example, a
cell phone can be used for phone calls or to detonate a roadside bomb.
42.
Wassenaar Arrangement Origins, supra note 39.
43.
Id.
44.
About Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 13.
45.
A license is an authorization from the government to engage in a particular export
transaction(s). 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2021).
46.
See Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, in WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
SECRETARIAT, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES: FOUNDING DOCUMENTS 7 (2019), https://www.wassenaar.org
/app/uploads/2019/12/WA-DOC-19-Public-Docs-Vol-I-Founding-Documents.pdf.
47.
See Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods, supra note 14, category 5,
pt. 2.
48.
Eva Galperin & Nate Cardozo, What Is the U.S. Doing About Wassenaar, and Why
Do We Need to Fight It?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2015), https://www.eff.org
/deeplinks/2015/05/we-must-fight-proposed-us-wassenaar-implementation.
49.
Commission Delegated Regulation 1382/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 371) 1–212, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R1382&from=EN.
50.
The Commerce Control List details a list of items under the export control
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, and
generally includes dual-use non-military items. See 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2021).
51.
See Galperin & Cardozo, supra note 48.
52.
Roszel Thomsen & Philip Thomsen, Export Controls on Intrusion and Surveillance
Items: Noble Sentiments Meet the Law of Unintended Consequences . . ., J. INTERNET L., Sept.
2015, at 22, 30.
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would have a “chilling effect” on cyber research. Other groups believed
the drafting of the regulations was overly broad and would hurt the U.S.
54
security research industry. This initial opposition to the proposed rule led
the U.S. government to implement an interim rule, and it went back to the
55
Wassenaar Arrangement to renegotiate the scope and language of the rule.
In 2017, the Wassenaar Arrangement made significant changes that were
proposed as final rules in the United States and will become effective on
56
January 22, 2022.
Other countries have taken a regional approach to addressing
cyberweapon concerns. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (“SCO”) concluded an agreement that sought to limit the
57
proliferation of cyberweapons and “information terrorism.” The SCO
58
includes countries such as China, India, Russia, and Pakistan.
Commentators believe the definition of “information war” as “mass
psychologic[al] brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well as to
force the state to take decisions in the interest of an opposing party”
59
attempts to justify censorship. The SCO agreement stands in opposition to
the Wassenaar approach because it uses a more expansive definition of
cyberweapons and their capabilities. It also encompasses countries, such as
China, that are not parties to major existing international arms control
60
treaties.
The SCO approach includes not only programs that target areas such as
critical infrastructure but also views cyberweapons from a political
61
perspective. This perspective was summarized by Sergei Korotkov in his
62
discussion at a 2008 U.N. disarmament conference. Korotkov defined
aggression as “anytime a government promotes ideas on the internet with
53.
ALLEN HOUSEHOLDER & ART MANION, CERT COORDINATION CENTER,
COMMENTS ON B UREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY PROPOSED RULE: WASSENAAR
ARRANGEMENT 2013 PLENARY AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION: INTRUSION AND
SURVEILLANCE ITEMS 4-6 (2015), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/WhitePaper/2015
_019_001_442291.pdf.
54.
See, e.g., Galperin & Cardozo, supra note 48.
55.
Information Security Controls: Cybersecurity Items, 86 Fed. Reg. 58205, 58206
(Jan. 19, 2022) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 772, 774).
56.
Id.
57.
Agreement on Cooperation in Ensuring International Information Security between
the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Annex 1, June 16, 2009
[hereinafter SCO Agreement], http://eng.sectsco.org/load/207508.
58.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, UNITED NATIONS: DEP’T OF POL. &
PEACEBUILDING AFFS., https://dppa.un.org/en/shanghai-cooperation-organization (last visited
Nov. 26, 2021).
59.
Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 825
(2012).
60.
See About Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 13.
61.
Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’ NPR (Sept. 23,
2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701.
62.
Id.
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the goal of subverting another country’s government.” This conception of
aggression and cyberweapons as tools to subvert a foreign government’s
legitimacy is more expansive than the definition proscribed in the
64
Wassenaar Arrangement. The SCO’s cyberweapon definition highlights a
difference of opinion that must be bridged if countries seek to develop a
cyberweapon framework that includes countries outside the Wassenaar
Arrangement.

II. THE PROBLEM
Cyberweapons pose a significant threat to international peace and
security. They have the potential to inflict significant harm on entire nations
65
with minimal investment from the instigating country. There are three
problems that must be addressed in considering the regulation of crossborder transfers between governments and private entities or persons:
defining a cyberweapon, the current gap in the arms control framework, and
the level of control applied.

A. Defining What Is a Cyberweapon
66

Under the Wassenaar Arrangement’s conception, the current inclusion
of intrusion software and software that defeats, weakens, or bypasses
information security is vague and creates a risk of differing interpretations.
For example, these categories may not include software taking control of
computers in preparation for a Distributed Denial of Service (“DDoS”)
attack. A DDoS attack occurs when a hacker takes control of many
computers then directs them to simultaneously and repeatedly access a
67
website or server to overload the target. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s
definition may not encompass this type of cyberweapon because, as
discussed below, its definitions is defined based on the software’s intent
68
rather than its technical characteristics. As a result, countries may differ in
whether they regulate DDoS preparation software based on this provision of
the Arrangement.
Additionally, the current approach by the Wassenaar Arrangement
reacts to gaps in the cyberweapons framework rather than proactively
including cyberweapons as they are developed. For example, the inclusion
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
See Phillip Pool, War of the Cyber World: The Law of Cyber Warfare, 47 INT’L L.
299, 303 (2013).
66.
Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods, supra note 14, category 5, pt. 2.
67.
What Is a Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS)?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS,
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-a-ddos-attack (last visited Nov. 26,
2021).
68.
See discussion infra Section B.
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of surveillance technology was in response to the transfer of surveillance
and intrusion technology to governments with a history of human rights
69
abuses. Furthermore, changes made to the Wassenaar Arrangement’s
control lists were provided as a clarification, and not in recognition of
70
cyberweapon’s growing threat. This reactive approach risks making the
definition of cyberweapons not reflective of technological advancements.
Cyberweapons span a range of capabilities unlike conventional
weapons that are clearly designed for military use and would have little
value to a benevolent citizen (for example, a civilian would have little use
71
for a heat seeking missile). On one end of the spectrum, there are those
cyberweapons Professors Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney describe as the
generic cyberweapons. Generic cyberweapons are analogous to paintball
guns—they look like a real weapon, but they do little damage, and it is
72
obvious when someone was attacked.
On the other end of the spectrum are specific cyberweapons, which are
73
specially designed to execute a defined mission. Under this framework, the
previously discussed Stuxnet virus would logically fall closer to the end of
“specifically designed” because it was developed over a period of time by
the west to specifically target Iranian nuclear facilities. This description of
cyberweapons by Professors Rid and McBurney is similar to the Wassenaar
notions of a cyberweapon, which focus on attacking critical infrastructure
74
by seeking to circumvent defenses.
By contrast, an opposing definition of cyberweapons includes
“informational terrorism,” which more broadly encompasses activities
75
excluded by the Wassenaar definition. The SCO Agreement demonstrates
a different conception of cyberweapons as including the ability to wage
76
informational warfare. Information warfare does not have a generally
accepted definition, but has been defined as denying, corrupting, or

See Thomsen & Thomsen, supra note 52, at 22–23.
WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT SECRETARIAT, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND
TECHNOLOGIES: BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS AND PLENARY-RELATED AND OTHER
STATEMENTS 57 (2020), https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2020/12/Public-Docs-VolIV-Background-Docs-and-Plenary-related-and-other-Statements-Dec.-2020.pdf.
71.
Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney, Cyber-Weapons, RSUI J., Feb.–Mar. 2012, at 6, 6,
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354.
72.
Id. at 6.
73.
Id.
74.
Cf. id. at 7 (describing cyberweapons in terms of harm from the psychological
dimension such as the intent to cause harm to the target).
75.
See SCO Agreement supra note 57, at 9–10 (defining “information terrorism” as
“using information resources in the information space and/or influencing on them for terrorist
purposes”).
76.
Id.
69.
70.
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77

exploiting an enemy’s information systems for military gain. While this
78
formulation is vague, it would include “psychological operations,” which
are defined by the Department of Defense as intended to “convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” with the purpose of
“induc[ing] or reinforc[ing] foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the
79
originator’s objectives.” Since the SCO deliberately chose the term
80
“terrorism” and focused on misinformation, they emphasized, among other
things, the psychological impact of cyberweapons in addition to the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s definition. This psychological concern would
include “misinformation” being distributed in their territory through the
81
internet. When the SCO Agreement was passed in 2009, commentators did
not raise concerns of misinformation distributed by foreign powers, but
82
rather focused on the impact it would have on civil liberties. Recent
campaigns by foreign governments in places such as the United States and
the United Kingdom may lead commentators to rethink this strict dismissal
83
of information warfare.

B. Gaps in the Current Arms Control Framework
Two areas create compliance gaps in the current arms control
framework. First, existing arms control agreements are vague in identifying
and controlling cyberweapons. Second, many cyberweapon exporters are
not a party to these international arms control agreements.
As previously discussed, the Wassenaar Arrangement imposed controls
on infiltration software focusing on programs that weaken, bypass, or defeat
84
information security. The vague language attached to this definition stands
in contrast to the scientifically specific language used in other parts of the
Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional kinetic weapons and dual-use
77.
Col. Andrew Borden, What Is Information Warfare?, AIR UNIV. CHRONS. ONLINE
J. (Nov. 2, 1999), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles
/borden.pdf.
78.
Id.
79.
Steven Aftergood, DoD “Clarifies” Doctrine on Psychological Operations, FED’ N
OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Jan. 19, 2010), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2010/01/psyop.
80.
SCO Agreement supra note 57, at 9–10 (defining “information terrorism” as “using
information resources in the information space and/or influencing on them for terrorist
purposes”).
81.
Id.
82.
Hathaway et al., supra note 59, at 825.
83.
See BEN NIMMO ET AL., GRAPHIKA, SECONDARY INFEKTION (2020),
https://secondaryinfektion.org/report/secondary-infektion-at-a-glance; Bobby Allyn, Study Exposes Russia
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items. For example, when defining what materials are controlled under
85
Category One, the Wassenaar Arrangement lists among other items
“[m]aterials not transparent to visible light and specially designed for
absorbing near-infrared radiation having a wavelength exceeding 810 nm
86
but less than 2000 nm.” Under the category “Materials Processing,” the
Wassenaar Arrangement controls “[r]otary position feedback units specially
designed for machine tools or angular displacement measuring instruments,
having an angular position ‘accuracy’ equal to or less (better) than 0.9
87
second of arc.” This technical definition contrasts to the vague language of
“[s]ystems, equipment and components for defeating, weakening or
bypassing ‘information security’, as follows . . . Designed or modified to
88
perform ‘cryptanalytic functions.’” This contrast in language highlights the
difficulty of applying parameters to define cyberweapons in an international
89
agreement, which is likely a motivating factor behind the Wassenaar’s
approach. It is an attempt to use the software’s intended capabilities rather
than its technical characteristics. However, focusing on the narrow intent of
“bypassing” or “defeating” information security raises many questions. For
example, does the definition cover cyberweapons that seek to slow down the
speed of a network connection to frustrate the user but are not intended to
defeat or weaken its security? This control framework could be more
specific and may potentially be underinclusive of these important
capabilities that have been used by malicious actors to slow down
90
government and nongovernment networks.
Secondly, many of the arms control agreements, such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement, do not include emerging cyberweapon developers such as
91
China and Israel as parties. Israel eased export restrictions for
92
cyberweapons in 2018 despite international criticism. China has also been
an active exporter of surveillance technology, including its Sensetime

Category One includes “Special Materials and Related Equipment.” Id. § 1.
Id. § 1.C.1.b.
Id. § 2.B.6.c.
Id. § 5.A.4.
See Trey Herr, PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber Weapons, 13 J. INFO.
WELFARE 87, 87 (2014).
90.
For example, in 2013, a conflict between two organizations led to a worldwide
slowdown of the internet when one organization engaged in a DDoS Attack against the other.
Dave Lee, Global Internet Slows After ‘Biggest Attack in History’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21954636.
91.
See About Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 13.
92.
See Tova Cohen & Ari Rabinovitch, Israel Eases Rules on Cyber Weapons Exports
Despite Criticism, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usisrael-hackers/israel-eases-rules-on-cyber-weapons-exports-despite-criticismidUSKCN1VC0XQ.
85.
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93

software to Mongolia. China’s Sensetime software enables the user
94
government to perform real-time identification of pedestrians and vehicles.
Since these countries are outside existing arms control agreements,
cyberweapon exports are unregulated and make attributing a particular
attack difficult.
An international approach towards controlling cyberweapons is critical
because, unlike traditional kinetic weapons, cyberweapon attacks are
95
difficult to accurately attribute to a particular actor. Persons, organizations,
and governments can obscure their identity in cyberspace by contracting
with third parties, facilitating attribution of the attack to another party, or
96
moving through other jurisdictions. Thus, when attributing an attack to a
malevolent actor, information sharing is important because the malware’s
origin plays an important part of drawing connections between the various
97
facets of a cyberattack. As a result, countries must work together to
address these concerns. When significant cyberweapon exporting countries
are not members of an international framework, they enable different actors
to engage in these veiled attacks by equipping them with the necessary tools
to accomplish their objectives.

C. Current Level of Control
The current level of control for cyberweapons treats certain software
similar to other dual-use items such as material processing equipment rather
98
than more sensitive technology. The Wassenaar Arrangement is largely
divided into two separate lists, first the dual-use control list for dual-use
99
non-military items, and second the munitions list. In an effort to increase
transparency, the munitions list requires more exchanging of information
93.
Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance 1, app. at 26 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WPFeldstein-AISurveillance_final1.pdf.
94.
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Boost Surveillance, NPR (Apr. 3, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018
/04/03/598012923/facial-recognition-in-china-is-big-business-as-local-governments-boostsurveilla.
95.
See Christopher S. Chivvis & Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, Why It’s So Hard to Stop a
Cyberattack—and Even Harder to Fight Back, RAND BLOG (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/03/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-a-cyberattack-and-even-harder.html;
Anu Narayanan & Jonathan Welburn, Is DarkSide Really Sorry? Is It Even DarkSide?, RAND
BLOG (May 19, 2021), https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/05/is-darkside-really-sorry-is-it-evendarkside.html.
96.
See Narayana & Welburn, supra note 95.
97.
See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 34, at 3.
98.
See Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods, supra note 14, §§ 2.B.6.c,
5.A (failing to classify penetration software as “sensitive,” similar to other dual-use items
such as material processing equipment).
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Control Lists, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar.org/controllists (last updated June 22, 2021).
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between the member states about licensed exports. By contrast, the dualuse list divides items into two tiers: “Basic Items” and “Sensitive Items and
101
its subset of Very Sensitive Items”. For Basic Items, countries must
provide a list of transfers twice per year for licenses that were denied for
transactions to non-member countries, whereas the Sensitive and Very
102
Sensitive items have stricter requirements. When an item is placed in the
Sensitive or Very Sensitive list, countries must report an approved
transaction within sixty days if another member denied an “essentially
103
identical” transaction. Furthermore, for Very Sensitive items, members
104
are called on to “exert extreme vigilance.”
Currently, nothing in Category Five part two is listed as sensitive or
105
very sensitive. Category Five part two of the Wassenaar Arrangement
dual-use list includes the previously mentioned software such as infiltration
106
software. When adopting these controls, the plenary communications for
the 2015 meeting do not mention why the Wassenaar Arrangement elected
107
not to classify this type of software as Sensitive or Very Sensitive items.
Given the opposition raised in the United States when the rules were
108
ultimately implemented, it is possible that the committee recognized that
stricter control would raise the public’s ire.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s agreement on cyberweapons
provides high-level guidance to signatory states on monitoring and
109
controlling cyberweapons. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s
approach includes information sharing but is less specific about under what
110
conditions transaction specific information should be shared. These
111
pledges were recently reaffirmed at a 2018 meeting.

III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Governments should further develop and agree on a cyberweapon
definition, as well as upgrade the level of control assigned to cyberweapons.
100.
Kimball, supra note 16.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
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104.
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105.
Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods, supra note 14, at 170–172.
106.
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107.
See Wassenaar Arrangement, Statement Issued by the Plenary Chair on 2015
Outcomes of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-use Goods and Technology (Dec. 3, 2015).
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See Galperin & Cardozo, supra note 48.
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See SCO Agreement, supra note 57.
110.
See id. art. 5.
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Council Secretaries, SHANGHAI COOP. ORG. (May 22, 2018), http://eng.sectsco.org/news
/20180522/431989.html.
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Cyberweapons have destructive capabilities that can result in human
112
casualties and take critical infrastructure offline. First, governments
should consider whether cyberweapons include software that disseminates
certain messages such as those spreading misinformation. The Western
experience concerning software that widely disseminates certain
113
information has changed since the original definition was drafted in 2015
and control lists may need to be updated to reflect this change. Although
decisions addressing misinformation while balancing civil rights concerns
deserve additional discussion, analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of
this Note. Second, a new treaty is necessary to bring together nations in the
Wassenaar Arrangement with those states outside it to develop a truly
global framework on cyberweapons. Third, the Wassenaar control lists for
cyberweapons should be drafted with greater specificity to ensure a uniform
regulatory framework. Finally, cyberweapons should be subject to greater
control because of the growing secondary market.

A. Cyberweapons Definition
The division between the SCO and the Wassenaar Arrangement over
defining a cyberweapon centers on, among other things, whether software
114
disseminating certain information qualifies as a cyberweapon. This type
115
of software was recently highlighted in a RAND report. The software in
question robotically re-tweets government-sponsored messages to blanket
the social media landscape and push their messages to the top of a user’s
116
newsfeed. Similarly, another analysis found that 20% of the Russian
News Network’s most avid followers accounted for 75% of their re117
tweets.
Russia has been accused of interfering in the United Kingdom and
118
United States elections through such use of social media. In 2019, the
European Union’s Commissioner for Security stated “[w]inter isn’t the only
119
thing that’s coming—so is the risk of interference in our elections,”
112.
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113.
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114.
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115.
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https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND
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Far About Russia’s 2016 Meddling, TIME (Apr. 18, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://time.com
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demonstrating the heightened risk of foreign interference in its elections
through means such as social media. In the 2020 U.S. presidential election,
this type of social media activity also led officials to determine foreign
governments were attempting to undermine U.S. confidence in the electoral
120
system. These developments demonstrate these nations may want to
revisit whether cyberweapons include software such as those disseminating
misinformation—but in doing so, freedom of speech and civil liberties must
remain protected.
With this backdrop, Western governments have already begun this
discussion. In the United States, Congress held hearings with major social
media CEOs to discuss each companies’ role in online misinformation and
121
extremism. Parliament in the United Kingdom created a subcommittee on
“Online Harms and Disinformation,” which began investigating online
122
disinformation and misinformation in the United Kingdom. The European
Parliament established the “Special Committee on Foreign Interference in
all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including
123
Disinformation.” These government efforts demonstrate they may also
wish to revisit the discussion of whether software distributing certain
information qualifies as a cyberweapon.

B. A New Cyber-Treaty
There is no comprehensive global treaty governing transfers of
cyberweapons between governments and private parties. For example, the
Wassenaar Arrangement does not include cyberweapon exporting countries
124
such as China and Israel. At the same time, technological advances enable
non-state actors to utilize cyberweapons and inflict harm on persons and
critical infrastructure. Thus, there is an immediate need to develop a new
cyber-arms control regime that encompasses the world’s cyberweapon
exporters. Furthermore, existing members of Cold War-era arms treaties
should seek to develop a new framework for restricting transfers of
cyberweapons between governments and private actors. First, a multilateral
120.
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123.
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treaty would address the growing secondary market for cyberweapon
utilization by state and non-state actors to inflict harm on other nations and
extract profits. Second, a multilateral treaty would enable cross-border
sharing of information to facilitate faster attribution of cyberattacks. Third,
when drafting this agreement, two key provisions should be adopted. The
presumption of denial approach taken from another arms control treaty, the
125
Missile Technology Control Regime, should be utilized for cyberweapon
export. Additionally, the control lists should follow the form utilized in the
Wassenaar Arrangement but provide specific types of cyberweapons as a
companion to clarify the control status of different software.
Having a comprehensive, global treaty is important to address the
growing secondary market for cyberweapons, where criminals utilize
cyberweapons purchased on the dark web with cryptocurrency to engage in
126
illegal activity. Previously, crimes such as bank robbery required someone
with a gun to run inside a bank and hold up the teller. Now, the
decentralized nature of the dark web enables cybercriminals to buy
127
cyberweapons such as ransomware to engage in crime from afar. The
person engaging in the attack can buy the ransomware on the internet from
the software’s developer, which separates the developer from the
128
perpetrator. As a result, the decentralized nature of the internet allows
these criminals to anonymously create and sell cyberweapons.
A multilateral treaty would create non-binding obligations on states to
address this growing secondary market. Treaties such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement create non-binding obligations on states to standardize how
129
export controls are implemented at the member country level. Adopting a
multilateral regime with states taking corresponding domestic action would
decrease the cross-border flow of cyberweapons and increase the difficulty
of developing these weapons. Given the international nature of cybercrime,
a multinational treaty would create a framework to identify these
cybercriminals and allow states to bring them to justice.
Moreover, a multilateral treaty would address the problem of attributing
cyberattacks to particular actors because countries would have records of
cyberweapon transfers. As previously mentioned, the Wassenaar
Arrangement requires information sharing for exports of certain arms and
130
dual-use items. If a multilateral regime were developed for cyberweapons,
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it should include a similar type of information sharing mechanism to
facilitate the identification of malware used in cyberattacks. Since the type
of malware plays an important role in attributing an attack to a particular
131
actor, sharing malware and other cyberweapon export information would
enable faster attribution of an attack.
In drafting this framework, authors should incorporate two key concepts
from existing arms control treaties. Firstly, for cyberweapons, a
presumption of denial approach should be adopted to restrict the
deployment of these technologies. Secondly, as discussed in the next
section, specific control lists should be utilized as a companion to the broad
control principles utilized in the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The presumption of denial approach, utilized in the Missile Technology
Control Regime (“MTCR”), would create a “strong presumption of denial”
for exports of cyberweapons designed to directly harm persons or critical
132
infrastructure. The strong presumption of denial requirement means the
exporting government may authorize export of these items on rare
133
occasions. Given the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles,
this strong approach seems appropriate. Similarly, cyberweapons pose a
substantial threat because they can damage infrastructure and create an
unlimited number of copies from a single source code. This destructive
power was shown by the recent state of emergency declaration in the United
134
States following the cyberattack on a Colonial Pipeline facility. Moreover,
as shown in the Stuxnet example, once a cyberweapon is deployed other
135
derivative weapons can be developed based on the original source code.
The presumption of denial approach can prevent the initial release that
could ultimately lead to untold proliferation of cyberweapons over the
internet.

C. Upgrading Cyberweapon Control Status
Cyberweapons such as intrusion software and their underlying source
code should be added to the Sensitive or Very Sensitive lists in the
Wassenaar Arrangement to reflect their danger to international peace and
security. Following the approach of Professors Thomas Rid and Peter
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136

McBurney, source code should be deemed “very sensitive” when it is
specially designed for infiltration of specific computer networks, whereas
other commercial software that has dual-use capabilities should be
controlled in the sensitive category. This demarcation would align the
control status for intrusion with its capabilities since software specifically
designed for intrusion represents a substantial risk to a country’s national
security and foreign policy interests. As recent cyberattacks show,
infiltration software poses a substantial risk because it allows malicious
137
actors to access critical networks.
Moreover, heightening the control status of infiltration software would
reduce the ability for cybercriminals to use infiltration software to access
computer networks and hold them for ransom. As the recent attack on
Colonial Pipeline in the United States demonstrates, cybercriminals are
138
willing and able to infiltrate a network then hold it for ransom. Upgrading
the control status of infiltration software would heighten the legal
obligations of states to report these transfers and hopefully reduce criminals’
ability to access this software.
Additionally, heightening the control status of infiltration software and
other cyberweapons would further other sanctions programs. Many
ransomware attacks benefit countries already under United Nations
sanctions. For example, according to a United Nations report, North Korea
generated $2 billion in revenue in 2019 from its ransomware program to
139
fund its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Other nations subject to
sanctions such as Iran have also been known to engage in ransomware
140
attacks. Heightening the restrictions on intrusion software and other
cyberweapon exports should reduce the ability of these nations to access the
valuable source code that enables their operations.

D. Enumerating Specific Cyberweapon Capabilities
141

Cyberweapons such as computer worms should be specifically
enumerated on the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control lists as a companion to

136.
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the overarching principles defining them. As discussed above, the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s control lists typically include the specific
142
capabilities of items subject to control. The overarching definitions such
as software designed to weaken or degrade encryption are helpful in
determining what is a cyberweapon, but greater guidance on categorizing
particular software is needed. Until the specific components of
cyberweapons are described, the Wassenaar Arrangement should provide, as
a supplement, greater detail on what constitutes a cyberweapon by
categorizing specific types of software. Providing this level of specificity
would clarify ambiguities in the division of this technology.
Cyberweapons appear on both the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Munitions
List, which details military items, and the dual-use control list, but the
difference between the two definitions is unclear. Clearly delineating the
difference is important because ambiguities may lead to differing
implementations creating regulatory gaps where exports illegal in one
country under the Wassenaar Arrangement are allowed in another. The
Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List includes “‘[s]oftware’ specifically
designed or modified for the conduct of military offensive cyber
143
operations.” “Cyberspace Offensive Operations” are defined by the U.S.
military to include “operations intended to project power by the application
144
of force in and through cyberspace.” Intrusion software would seemingly
fit this category. It is software that is designed to infiltrate systems, which
would project power against adversaries through cyberspace because
infiltration is the first step of crippling an adversary’s system. However, as
detailed above, intrusion software is specifically enumerated on the dual-use
145
control list, which is subject to less restrictions than the Munitions list.
This vagueness creates ambiguity on which types of intrusion software
should be classified as military items and which software would qualify as
dual-use. Moreover, different countries may implement the same treaty
provision in different ways, but more concrete evidence of whether this is
occurring is not available. Such a situation undermines the Wassenaar
Arrangement’s usefulness as a global platform for standardizing export
controls. Categorizing cyberweapons under each list would alleviate this
confusion because it would assign specific types of software to each
category, which would harmonize control status between different countries.
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CONCLUSION
Cyberweapons are a significant threat to international peace and
security. The current framework does not adequately address identifying
and controlling cyberweapons. However, a series of changes could begin to
address the problem cyberweapons pose to international peace and security.
First, states should develop a common definition of a cyberweapon. Second,
states should form a multilateral treaty utilizing the shared definition to
ensure cyberweapon exports are governed by a treaty and include a greater
geographic diversity covering a larger share of this market. Third, under the
Wassenaar Arrangement, cyberweapons should be subject to additional
control because exports can lead to derivative viruses, which multiply the
harm of the original export. Finally, cyberweapons should be listed with
greater specificity to reduce the ambiguity associated with the current
definition. These changes represent significant steps toward reducing the
ability of cybercriminals to access these dangerous weapons. As a result,
international cooperation can reduce the risk a cyberweapon will cause real
harm to society.

